Abstract. Some tally methods for preferential elections are discussed from the following point of view: How well do they respect a wish from the voter that subsidiary votes in the ballot cannot hurt the chances of the ballot's top-ranked candidate? The standard variation of single transferable votes (STV) is constructed to obey this principle, but other defects show up, in particular nonmonotonicity, premature eliminations, and free rides. The tax cut algorithm is also an essential part of Meek's modification of STV. Properties of the algorithm are established and other ways to apply it are considered, with the purpose of reducing the election method's weaknesses without losing too many of its strengths.
(i) The social relation φ is always transitive and complete.
(ii) For any candidate pair {x, y} the restriction φ| {x,y} is well defined as a function of the restrictions φ i | {x,y} , 1 ≤ i ≤ v. Axiom (i) is satisfied by any election method that ranks the candidates according to a number of "points" calculated from the ballot information, i.e., the φ i . The prototype is the Borda count, where voter i gives candidate x one point for each candidate y such that i strictly prefers x over y. The prototype φ which satisfies the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom (ii) is the Condorcet pairing, i.e., that xφy if the number of ballots with xφ i y is at least as large as the number of ballots with yφ i x.
The Borda count is very open to "strategic" manipulation attempts: a voter may sometimes obtain an outcome φ closer to an "honest" choice of φ i by making another, "strategic" choice of φ i in the ballot. The Condorcet relation is harder to manipulate, but may include cycles x 1 φ x 2 , x 2 φ x 3 , . . . , x r−1 φ x r , x r φ x 1 , with at least one case of strict social preference. In particular, there need not be any Condorcet winner w ∈ C, i.e., a candidate such that wφz for all z ∈ C.
The two axioms (i) and (ii) are both trivially satisfied in a couple of quite unpalatable election methods, e.g., where φ is a constant ("tradition"), not influenced by the voters at all, or a projection φ = φ d ("dictatorship") . The tradition method is ruled out by the Pareto axiom: (iii) if xφ i y is true for all i, and yφ i x is false for some i, then xφy but not yφx. The "impossibility theorem" of Arrow (1963) assumes linear φ i and states that it is impossible to satisfy (i), (ii), and (iii) simultaneously except with a dictatorship. This practical incompatibility between desires (i) and (ii) has been an underlying theme in much of election theory ever since the days of Borda (1781) and Condorcet (1785) .
Φ is anonymous if it treats all voters equally in the sense that Φ(φ 1 , φ 2 , . . . , φ v ) = Φ(φ 1λ , φ 2λ , . . . , φ vλ )
for any permutation λ of the voters, and Φ is neutral if it treats all candidates equally:
for any permutation µ of the candidates, where ρµ = {(xµ, yµ)|xρy}. Single transferable votes (STV; Definition 3) is a family of election methods that essentially requires each φ i to be linear. The common STV versions exploit ballot linearity to avoid completely a certain defect, here called "disrespect of ballot rankings" (Definition 1). This defect invites and sometimes even urges manipulation attempts in other election methods. That makes STV basically different from the interrelated election methods of Condorcet, Borda, and Nanson, all of which have much larger natural domains.
Then xφy in Condorcet's sense if C(x, y) ≥ C(y, x) and in Borda's sense if B(x) ≥ B(y).
Tallied this way, Borda's method is seen to aggregate the election data on a higher level than Condorcet's method. The ordinary Borda tally, however, considers each ballot only once in the calculation of B(x) and calculates that voter i gives candidate x a point total of B(i, x) = Σ q P (i, x, q); then, of course, B(x) = Σ q C(x, q) = Σ q Σ i P (i, x, q) = Σ i Σ q P (i, x, q) = Σ i B (i, x) . φ i is linear if and only if different x ∈ C have different B(i, x) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}, and nonlinear ballots may be detected and discarded in an ordinary Borda tally. This may cause the misconception that Borda based on B(x) = ΣB(i, x) is designed for rational voters who have linear preferences, although Condorcet clearly is not. The first summation B(x) = ΣC(x, q) shows that since Condorcet's pairwise comparisons pay no attention to whether a ballot is transitive or not, neither does Borda's point aggregation. Both methods are naturally defined for all 2 p(p−1) reflexive relations. Condorcet extensions are election methods that satisfy axiom (i) and coincide with Condorcet's relation on every subset of C without two candidates from the same cycle. Nanson's method (1882) is an elimination method. One version eliminates from the ballots a candidate with minimal Borda sum B(x) , another, all candidates with less than average B(x). New Borda sums are calculated and so on, until a Nanson winner remains. To continue Nanson's ranking, repeat the procedure with the Nanson winner(s) removed. To see that this is a Condorcet extension, notice that P (i, x, y) + P (i, y, x) = 1 for all i when x = y. Summations show that for each candidate pair {x, y}, C(x, y) + C(y, x) = v (v voters), and for each voter i, Σ x B(i, x) = Σ x Σ q P (i, x, q) = Σ {x,q} (P (i, x, q) + P (i, q, x)) = Σ {x,q} 1 = p(p − 1) 2 .
The "Smith set" is the smallest nonempty subset S of C such that C(x, y) > v/2 whenever x ∈ S, y ∈ C\S. Choose w ∈ S with an at least average Borda sum in an election restricted to S, i.e., Σ z∈S C(w, z)
with strict inequality if S = C. Thus there is always a w ∈ S who has an at least average Borda sum and cannot be eliminated; usually S is a singleton set, S = {w}, where w is a unique Condorcet winner who ultimately becomes a Nanson winner.
Transitive Preferences, Honest
Voting, and Rationality. In most elections rational voters will produce transitive ballots, but this should not be expected from, say, judges in a sport arranged as a set of pairwise encounters. It is not necessarily irrational to consider that x beats y, y beats z, and z beats x. Conceivably, a political election could be arranged the same way: the candidates meet in a round-robin tournament of public discussion duels, and after the x vs. y encounter, each voter expresses either no opinion, a win for x, a win for y, or a draw. The score set {C(x, y)} suffices for Condorcet, Borda, and Nanson tallies. Individual ballots are not used, and a tally official cannot check ballots for transitivity. The STV variations studied here are designed for and require linear voter preferences φ i .
In most studies and applications ballots are restricted to be at least transitive anyway, but some weaknesses of an election method may perhaps stem from the facts that the tally does not make use of the linearity in every ballot and that the restriction of the domain is artificial.
Definition 1. Assume each φ i is linear. Let R(i, j) be the candidate ranked as j by voter i. An election method that yields a reflexive, transitive, and complete φ respects the ballot ranking φ i if the information in vector (R(i, j + 1), R(i, j + 2), . . . , R(i, p) ) from the ballot of voter i cannot influence the final rankings of candidates R(i, 1), R(i, 2), . . . , R(i, j) .
A tally that respects all ballot rankings may be done by an official who puts one candidate at a time into a final list (first or last vacant place in the case of STV). The official requests that voter i, i = 1, 2, . . . , v, vote just for the candidate ranked first according to φ i among those candidates that are not yet put into the final list. Based exclusively on the information so far collected, the official then puts one more candidate into the final list, and repeats the request.
The standard STV method, described in section 2 below, respects all ballot rankings. Modifications and variations of this principle may be contemplated. The official may, e.g., ask voters only for their last candidate, or for their first and last candidate.
Borda's method does not respect ballot rankings. It may happen, e.g., that if a voter ranks x > y > z 1 > z 2 > z 3 > · · · , then y becomes the Borda-winner, but if the same voter instead ranks x > z 1 > z 2 > z 3 > y > · · · , then x becomes the Borda-winner.
Thus an honest second choice may hurt the first choice of a group of voters, which may be seen as an undemocratic abuse of their ballots. It also invites "strategic voting." The manipulability may be reduced, e.g., in a tally that ranks x according to the median B(i, x) over the i. This "median-Borda" method still does not build on transitivity, but at least it requires some processing of the individual ballots. MedianBorda is now the main ranking principle in figure skating contests. Various Condorcet extensions might be better: Truchon (1998) favored the one due to Kemeny (1959) . In political elections it is rare not to have a Condorcet winner, but in assemblies with a few voting blocks Condorcet cycles are more likely to happen. One real example occurred when the Norwegian national assembly (Stortinget) voted on the location of the major airport for the capital region on October 8, 1992 (Stensholt (1999 ), Hylland (2001 ).
Condorcet extensions are suited to ranking candidates according to merit, as in sports. They are not suited to giving a roughly proportional representation of voter groups, as one may want in politics, because they tend to rank candidates according to their distance from the political center. Candidates from the political center are ranked first, and general elections based on a Condorcet extension may leave even large groups unrepresented (Stensholt (1996) ).
How to achieve a better distribution of seats and at the same time protect against abuse of ballots? STV serves both purposes by giving each voter a certain voting power or "weight," which is used to support candidates in the order of priority specified on the ballot, and which is reduced (in multiseat elections) whenever the voter has supported an elected candidate.
There are, however, limits to perfection. The essential message of the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem (Gibbard (1973) , Satterthwaite (1975) ) is that there will always exist sets of individual preference relations ("profiles") that allow manipulation. Thus, if one has successfully constructed an election method that respects ballot rankings (Definition 1), and the manipulation possibilities associated with disrespect have thus been removed, some other flaws and new manipulation possibilities must pop up. Anything else is too good to be true. R(i, j) .
The
Is STV democratic? Unfortunately, it is nonmonotonic. Thus, in standard STV (Definition 3), there are situations where voter i will hurt candidate x by giving top rank to x instead of z. Similarly the supporters of x may help x to be elected by a sacrifice of top ranks, giving some of them to z instead of x. Nonmonotonicity is linked to elimination of candidates, which may occur in the STV tally. Voter i hurts x by causing z to be eliminated instead of a third candidate y. The smart supporters of x will recover their sacrifice by having y eliminated instead of z and then let x grab subsidiary votes from the supporters of y. One possible setting is that x is a moderate left wing candidate, z is a right wing candidate further from the center, and y is in the center (Example 2).
It is an understandable thought that the nonmonotonicity casts doubt upon the method's democratic character (Brams and Fishburn (1991) ). How serious for democracy are these new manipulation possibilities that come with nonmonotonicity?
Let us compare with those single-seat elections that are performed in two stages with a run-off between the two best if no candidate gets a majority (> 50%) of the votes at the first stage. In our context of linear ballot rankings φ i , only top ranks count. In the situation described above, some supporters of x may by voting for z at the first stage to make sure that x meets the weaker rival z instead of the stronger rival y in the run-off. The same supporters will, of course, vote for x in the run-off, and in a secret election nobody will notice that two ballots from the same voter are not both compatible with any single linear preference. In STV voters commit themselves by voting strategically, z > x > y, with the purpose of keeping z in the race instead of y. In an "instant run-off" based on the same ballots as in the first-round count, they still support z over x. Thus in STV there is a larger risk that the x supporters who vote z > x > y miscalculate and in fact let z win. This deterrence protects against strategy attempts. The manipulation idea is more likely to work in a run-off with new ballots, but it looks uglier in STV. When a missed opportunity for this type of strategic voting lets y win, x is "punished for too much support."
The democratic process does not start with a formal election in the shape of a relation map Φ; it starts long before and has many stages, e.g., nominations of candidates from the political parties and informal but important discussions before that. With an increased number of stages and increased informality come increased possibilities for influencing the final outcome by arguing and voting in ways that would be incompatible with a commitment to a linear ranking of all possible candidates. They may just be harder to analyze than in formal elections.
1.5. A Democratic Idea: Every Vote Counts. One main idea behind STV is to reduce "wasting of votes." The purpose of eliminating a candidate who by some criterion is ranked last is to allow the voters who support this candidate to transfer their support to their next-ranked candidates. It is understandable that this purpose is considered truly democratic. It is known to be very hard for a voter group to manipulate an STV election by exploiting the nonmonotonicity (Nurmi (1992) ), because this requires accurate knowledge of the preference profile and accurate execution (Example 2).
The STV may be seen as an improvement over the widespread plurality method. The Jenkins Commission recommended replacing the plurality method in British parliamentary elections by a new system with STV in single-seat constituencies for 80-85% of the seats (Jenkins (1998) ). Presumably the overall effect of such a change was considered to improve the voting system's democratic character, despite the nonmonotonicity.
The frame of reference must be wide when the task is to choose an election system. The performance of various voting systems should be compared against the background of the entire political landscape and tradition in which the system is supposed to serve. The recommendation of STV in the Jenkins report is based on such considerations. Another example may be approval voting, where, in effect, each ballot is reflexive, complete, and transitive and defines two indifference classes, the approved and disapproved candidates, and xφy if and only if x has at least as many approvals as y. It appears that the main arenas for approval voting are elections of officers in large professional organizations (Brams and Fishburn (1992) ). Assume that each voter has linear preference φ i and the ballot contains φ i together with a number a i , so that voter i approves candidate R(i, j) if and only if j ≤ a i . Then approval voting does not respect the ballot ranking φ i . A voter who in a (hypothetical) linear ballot would prefer x to y may hurt x by approving both. A voter able to quantify preferences ("cardinal utility") may like approval voting if there is exactly one large preference jump down the ranking list.
Also, in such a wide frame of reference, shortcomings of the method used in the final formal election may be relevant. In the broader context, however, the worst consequence of the nonmonotonicity of STV may well be on the psychological level; it appears unfortunate that to give one's favorite candidate top rank is not necessarily the best possible support.
1.6. Properties of Standard STV and Tax Cut STV. Although many variations on the STV theme exist, it is still worth trying to find those that avoid or reduce obvious weaknesses that remain in the rest. In section 2 some weaknesses are identified and remedies suggested. The "intermediate tallies" approach (Definition 4) reduces the risk of prematurely eliminating a candidate with a high potential for subsidiary votes. Doing the intermediate tallies by means of the "tax cut" algorithm (Definition 5) reduces the free rider problem which is ubiquitous in other STV variations except those variations due to Meek (1969 Meek ( , 1970 , where the same tax cut idea is applied (subsection 2.8 below), although with more restrictions in order to maintain the respect for ballot rankings (Definition 1).
The tax cut algorithm converges to a solution vector for an equation system. The uniqueness of the solution vector [T * (x)] of Theorem 1 was proved by Woodall in Hill, Wichman, and Woodall (1987) ; a shorter alternative proof is given below.
Tax cut STV also makes it easy to deal with ballots in which only some of the candidates have been ranked, by assuming that unranked candidates form an indifference class at the end of the ballot ranking. In fact, as shown in section 2.6 the tax cut STV allows all reflexive, transitive, and complete φ i . The idea is simply to replace such a ballot by all compatible linear ballots and to reduce their weight appropriately in the tally. In some multiseat STV elections there is the additional legal requirement that both the number of male and the number of female representatives satisfy some lower bound, and it is shown how the tax cut method can be used to satisfy this bound without changing the political character of the seat distribution. Most gains have a cost. In this case, there is a relaxation of the respect for ballot rankings.
Monotonicity is discussed in section 3. An intermediate tax cut tally is an iterative algorithm that ranks the candidates by letting each voter transfer the surplus part of the vote from one candidate to the next. The known cases of nonmonotonicity are linked to eliminations, but it is still not clear if the ranking obtained by one intermediate tax cut tally is actually monotonic. With a small technical modification of the tally ("reduced quota," Definition 6), the ranking obtained by an intermediate tax cut tally is shown to be monotonic (Theorem 2).
The support that a voter has given to the weakest candidate, say z, depends on how high the voter ranked z. The purpose of eliminating z is to let all z voters transfer their full vote to the next intermediate tally and have the same influence on the final ranking of the candidates with real chances to win a seat. Eliminations therefore help to reduce the wasting of votes or parts of votes. However, eliminations also tend to introduce nonmonotonicity. To avoid eliminations and let each ballot have some influence on who will be elected, one may use tax cut STV on the reversed ballot rankings. Then candidates who "lose" in the "worst candidate" contest are removed from the race by getting elected.
Single Transferable Votes.
The STV tally is designed to fill s seats in a roughly proportional way. Unlike Condorcet's method, or the derived methods of Borda and Nanson, STV requires each ballot φ i to be a linear ordering of the candidates. The STV tally is performed in several rounds. Each round either ends with the election of a candidate who satisfies a specified election criterion or, if no candidate satisfies the criterion, ends with the elimination of a candidate who is ranked last according to some specified elimination criterion.
The Standard STV.
In standard STV, defined below, v voters elect s from a set of p candidates. The parameter θ ∈ (0, 1] specifies the election criterion, usually θ = 1. STV has the elimination idea in common with Nanson's method, but it also adopts another fundamental idea, as follows.
Definition 3. The ballot weight w(i, r) determines the influence of voter i in round r, and
A voter, i, who gave top rank to candidate x in round r gets reduced voting power, i.e., w(i, r + 1) < w(i, r), if and only if x was elected in round r. Let t be the number of candidates elected in rounds 1, 2, . . . , r − 1. The weights are reduced in such a way that
with a constant θ. Round r consists of three steps.
Step 1. Define V (z, r) as the set of voters who rank z first in round r and calculate
Step 2. Choose two remaining candidates x and y so that
Step 3a. If W (x, r) > v s+θ , elect candidate x to seat t + 1 and calculate new weights:
Step 3b. If W (x, r) ≤ v s+θ , eliminate y from the race and keep all weights:
An s = 1 case is discussed in Example 2. All φ i are linear, so each voter belongs to a unique set V (z, r) in round r. By (5) the weight reductions sum up to v/(s + θ). The total weight reduction may of course be distributed among the voters in V (x, r) in other ways than in Step 3a. The idea of Step 3a is that x collects a "tax" with tax rate v · (s + θ)
−1 from all voters in the set V (x, r). These voters have received the same satisfaction in round r by having their top-ranked candidate x elected. The taxation idea turns out to be advantageous in dealing with the free rider problem discussed below.
Comment 1. Other elimination criteria than Step 3b may be contemplated. Coombs's criterion calculates, for each candidate c, the weight sum of the voters who rank c last, and eliminates accordingly. It favors compromise candidates. A controversial candidate with 49% top ranks, 2% second ranks, and 49% bottom ranks is likely to win a single-seat standard STV election after Step 3b eliminations of other candidates, but is also likely to be the first one eliminated under Coombs' criterion. The Coombs STV does not respect ballot rankings, because it uses the last ranking before the fate of all candidates higher on the ballot is clear. However, it may be implemented by an election official who asks voters only for their top-ranked and bottom-ranked candidate.
The Problem of Premature Eliminations and Intermediate Tallies.
Comment 2. The gain of a seat is taxed higher with smaller θ. Multiseat STV creates a conflict of interests: big parties may want Droop's quota defined by θ = 1 to keep more weight after taxation, hoping for more seats. A smaller θ may increase the risk of a "premature elimination." With a large number p of candidates, eliminations should serve to guide voters who have much in common towards a compromise candidate x, but it may happen that x has too few top ranks and gets prematurely eliminated. To facilitate this guidance, one may eliminate candidates who seem not to benefit much from transfers of surplus votes. This is done with "intermediate tallies," which builds up the final ranking of the candidates from last to first. 
The Problem of Free Riding and the Tax Cut Algorithm.
Another obvious weakness of the STV (s ≥ 3) is "free riding." Consider two voters: voter a ranks x as 1 and y as 2, voter b ranks y as 1 and x as 2. Suppose x is elected to the first seat in round 1, and y to the second in round 2. The weight of voter a gets reduced twice, the weight of voter b only once. After two seats are filled, they have obtained the same satisfaction because their two top-ranked candidates are elected, but w(a, 3) < w(b, 3). Voter b has got a free ride and has more influence than voter a on the remaining seats. Free rides may also occur inside an intermediate tally (Comment 2) for any value of s.
Free riding in this sense does not assume strategic voting. A voter may of course rank his or her favorite candidate x far down, by strategy, trusting that x is popular enough to be elected anyway at the expense of other voters, and thus obtain a "free ride" in a different sense, leaving it to other voters to pay the bill for electing x.
Free rides of the second, strategic kind, cannot be detected from the tally, but free rides of the first kind can. To avoid them, each intermediate tally should impose equal taxation on voters who have received equal satisfaction. This is achieved with the "tax cut" algorithm.
Tax cut STV uses intermediate tallies (Definition 4), but each intermediate tally is run as a "tax cut" process due to Meek (1969 Meek ( , 1970 .
Definition 5. Let T (x) ∈ [0, 1] be a "tax rate" charged by candidate x. We may imagine a "taxation market" where voter i with voting weight P (i)
• first offers candidate
A candidate x who collects more "revenue" than a required quota Q(x) cuts the tax rate accordingly, all revenue is paid back to the voters, and the process is repeated with new tax rates, some decreased but none increased.
There are unique limit tax rates
If there is enough voting power to fill all quotas, i.e., Σ x Q(x) ≤ Σ i P (i), the process converges to a market equilibrium where candidate x collects revenue Q(x), x ∈ C, and in the final ranking x > y means T * (x) < T * (y). An election method is anonymous if all voters are treated equally; then all P (i) are equal. It is neutral if all candidates are treated equally; then all Q(x) are equal. Without loss of generality the P (i) may be scaled so that Σ i P (i) = v. Then, in an anonymous election, P (i) = 1 for all i. All voting weight is spent if
A tally simulates this market and approximates the equilibrium. Define S(i, k) by
The meaning is that voter i offers R(i, k) (i.e., the candidate ranked k by voter i) support
, then x can cut the tax to as far down as T (x) given by
and still keep revenue at least Q(x). In programming notation, a maximal cut is done by setting T (x) := T (x).
Properties of the Tax Cut Algorithm.
Lemma. After a tax cut from one candidate, all candidates are offered increased support or the same support as before.
Proof. Let x cut taxes and let i be an arbitrary voter. By (7) i offers y unchanged support if i ranks y before x or if y = x. If i ranks y after x, then i offers y increased support if all candidates above y in the ballot charge less than 100%, and otherwise unchanged support (= 0).
Consider an infinite process of tax cuts from each candidate x with revenue above Q(x), so that S(x) → Q(x) for such x. At the start T (x) = 1 and, if the election is anonymous, then S(x) = W (x, 1) = the number of top ranks for x. However, the natural frame for the following equilibrium result is the general setting, without assumptions on anonymity or neutrality.
, which is the same for every such tax cut process. If
] is the only equilibrium, i.e., tax vector that makes S(x) = Q(x) for every candidate x.
Proof. Candidate x can never afford a tax rate below
, so the convergence is obvious. Consider two convergent processes, I and II, and let the tax vectors before cut number t + 1 be [T (x, t) I ] and [T (x, t) II ], respectively. It suffices to show that for any t there is a u such that
This is clear for t = 0 and is assumed inductively. Let x do tax cut number t + 1 in process I. By the lemma, x at [T (x, u) II ] has support at least as high as at [T (x, t) II , then x will have to cut tax so that T (x , t+1) I ≥ T (x , v) II at some later stage v in process II. Thus the uniqueness of the limit is established.
There is no other equilibrium tax vector. To see this, assume that [T • (x)] is an equilibrium.
First, run a tax cut process with the constraints that no x is allowed to cut below T
• (x), and obtain a limit [T (x)] where every cut would violate a constraint. Let Y and Z be the candidate subsets so that
Next, let each z ∈ Z cut taxes to T • (z) and obtain the equilibrium [T • (x)]. By the lemma, the support for y cannot decrease due to these cuts. Since
is also an equilibrium. It is the limit for a tax cutting process, so by the uniqueness, [T (
• (x) = 1 for some x, and since all z ∈ Z have cut taxes, T
• (y) = 1 for some y ∈ Y . Since the cuts from T (z) to T
• (z) did not increase S(y) for any y, all y ∈ Y are ranked ahead of all z ∈ Z in all ballots. This contradicts the notion that T
• (y) = 1 for some y ∈ Y . A candidate y with maximal T * (y) is eliminated. A tie-breaking rule may be in order, but except for rare cases, y is unique. Now consider the case Σ x Q(x) = Σ i P (i). The voters have spent all their voting power, so max(T * (x)) = 1. The eliminated candidate y is one whose support never (Stensholt (1996) , section 5). The data are the profile, with one imagined candidate from each party. The ballots are tallied in a tax cut STV election that is anonymous, neutral, and has Σ x Q(x) = Σ i P (i). Thus each voter i has initial voting weight P (i) = 1, and candidate x must pass the revenue Q(x) = v/p and be safe from elimination before starting to cut T (x).
The parties are listed alphabetically in Tables 1-5 and may, in this order, be briefly characterized as social democrat, market liberalist, conservative, Christian, socialist, agrarian, socialist, and liberal. H has much higher support in this particular student group than in the nation as a whole.
The briefest possible report of the result just states that the imagined candidates are eliminated in the order RV , Sp, V , SV , KrF , F rP , Ap, so that the final ranking is
More detail is given as the limit tax rates from each intermediate tally in percentages in Table 1 . F rP 's strength comes mainly from number 2 rankings after H. In a multiseat election with several candidates from each party, F rP would hardly do as well as it appears because H might gain more seats before transferring any remaining surplus to F rP . Tables 2-4 show how the support from three selected ballots is distributed among the candidates in each intermediate tally, after taxation with the limit taxes of Table 1 Voter 010 is a mainstream voter. Except in intermediate tallies 3 and 6, support from voter 010 trickles down the whole ballot before it balances the account by reaching the candidate who gets eliminated.
Voter 118 is an antiestablishment voter, who frequently puts all weight behind the candidate who gets eliminated. In intermediate tally 1, voter 118 supports only candidate RV , since RV never passes the required support 174/8 = 21.75. In intermediate tally 2, however, SV is the first choice of voter 118 and obtains the required support 174/7 = 24.8571 with the limit tax rate 84.0326, which enables voter 118 to offer support also to V with amount 0.159674. Since V has limit tax rate 73.056% and keeps 0.116651 of the support offered, voter 118 also supports KrF with 0.028580 after being taxed 66.431% and supports Sp, the last candidate in intermediate tally 2, with 0.014442.
Voters 010 and 011 both have Ap in third place, after H and F rP ; their support for Ap is therefore always the same even though voter 010 says H > FrP and voter 011 says F rP > H. Similarly, their support for KrF and V together is the same as long as both parties remain in the race. To speed up the process it is convenient to let all candidates with more than average revenue cut their taxes simultaneously, according to their surpluses. A candidate has to cut the tax rate when the revenue exceeds 174/8 = 21.75.
Finally some iterations are shown in more detail in Table 5 . The middle row in each row triple of Table 5 shows how much of their total revenue each candidate collects from voter 010. At the start, all candidates charge 100% tax. Voter 010, therefore, as one of 103 voters, gives the full vote to H; similarly 36 voters rank Ap on top and give their full vote there, etc. This brings both H and Ap past the critical revenue mark 21.75, and they lower their tax rates to 21.117% and 60.417%, respectively. Then voter 010 in the first iteration after reduced taxation from H brings 0.78883 votes along to F rP , who still charges 100%. The first iteration also brings candidate F rP past the mark. F rP proceeds to cut taxes to 57.159% at the same time as increased support to H and Ap make them cut taxes again. After the third iteration in intermediate tally 1, Sp will cut the tax rate, leaving only RV at 100%. Therefore, it is clear after just three iterations that RV will be eliminated in intermediate tally 1. At the twentieth iteration all tax rates are within 0.04% of the limits in the first line of Table 1 .
The Problem of Ballots with Unranked Candidates.
In practical applications, one must allow ballots where not all candidates are ranked. In standard STV it may be necessary with some emergency remedies: if ballots are ignored when they run out of ranked candidates, there may be insufficient voting power left to fill the vacant seats, and new quotas must be calculated.
It is natural to treat such a ballot as though the voter is indifferent between unranked candidates, who come after all ranked candidates. If u candidates are unranked, one may replace the ballot by u! ballots, one for each possible extension to a linear relation, and let each have an initial weight of 1/u!. This is easily implemented in tax cut STV, which may actually allow as a ballot any complete transitive relation in the candidate set.
Consider a voter i with remaining voting weight w who is about to offer support to a set E of candidates where xφ i y and yφ i x for all x, y ∈ E, i.e., an indifference set of candidates in the preference relation of voter i. Assume there are e candidates in E. The principle is that the ballot of i is counted with weight w · (e!) −1 behind each of the e! possible linear rankings of E.
Define q(x) = 1 − T (x), where T (x) is the current tax rate of x. Candidate x is listed as number k in (e − 1)! of these rankings, k = 1, 2, . . . , e. Consider a fixed order < of the candidates in E, e.g., alphabetical order. The rankings as number k bring x an offered support of
with summation over all subsets of E − {x} with k − 1 candidates. The total support offered to x by voter i becomes
The inner sum Σq(y 1 ) · q(y 2 ) · . . . · q(y k−1 ) is easily calculated as the coefficient p e−k of X e−k in the polynomial
Clearly p e−1 = 1. This algorithm is of order e 3 , but a simple modification is of order e 2 (Stensholt (2003)).
The Problem of Guaranteed Representation (of Both Genders, etc.).
There are elections for s seats with the legal requirement that at least r seats should be filled with candidates from a subset A of the candidate set. Assume the sequence of intermediate tax cut tallies have failed to do this, so that some of the s candidates x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x s who would otherwise have been elected must be sacrificed and replaced by candidates from A. The voters whose interests are most damaged by the sacrifice can be compensated by receiving accordingly stronger influence on the election of the replacements. This may be done by ordering x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x s according to their tax rates in another intermediate tax cut tally: The total voting weight is reduced from p = 174 to 58. With these initial weights and candidate set A = {RV, Sp, SV, V }, three more intermediate tax cut tallies eliminate RV, SV, Sp, in this order. Thus V emerges as the replacement for the sacrificed F rP , although SV stayed longer in the race in Table 1 .
Meek's Method.
In the Meek version of STV the tax cut algorithm is used as efficiently as possible with the constraint that ballot rankings must be respected. A practical way is to keep all candidates already elected in the ballots, and otherwise follow the standard STV. Thus candidates only leave the ballots by Step 3b, and the process is repeated with full weights. After an elimination a candidate already elected is automatically re-elected, but with wider support, reduced tax rate, and a more fair distribution of the costs. If Meek's method is applied to a single-seat election, the winner is found either in round 1 or after a sequence of eliminations which leave all weights unchanged. Thus, in the single-seat case it coincides with the standard STV. For any number of seats, a candidate to be eliminated must be picked before there has been a comparison of candidates based on all relevant profile information.
The election in Table 1 is in fact a sequence of Meek elections. Each intermediate tally is a Meek election, first with eight candidates for seven seats, then with seven candidates for six seats, etc. It gives a defter elimination process, where the only nonelected candidate in the intermediate tally is eliminated. There are no eliminations in the technical sense of Step 3b. The price is that ballot rankings are not always respected, because the eliminations are influenced by information that cannot be used in standard or Meek-style STV.
The "Newland-Britton" version of STV is close to the "standard STV" above and has been promoted by the Electoral Reform Society in the UK. This, or an essentially similar version, is used for multiseat elections in the Australian Senate, the Republic of Ireland, Malta, and Tasmania; in Northern Ireland for local elections; and for elections to the European Parliament. A single-seat version is used for the Australian House of Representatives and the Irish presidential election. Without much distortion, standard STV can be adapted to hand counting. With its essential use of the tax cut algorithm, Meek-style STV requires a computer. It has recently been adopted in New Zealand and is used by the Royal Statistical Society and the London Mathematical Society. Tideman and Richardson (2000) gave a survey of the basic ideas of STV.
3. Monotonicity. STV is actually nonmonotonic, and it is easy to concoct examples where strategic voting based on nonmonotonicity may succeed. The Borda count does not respect ballot rankings, and it is even easier to exploit that defect by strategic voting. In tax cut STV it seems harder to use either idea alone, but it is possible to use them in combination.
Strategic Voting in Three Kinds of Election.
Example 2. Consider a standard STV single-seat election with θ = 1 and candidates A, B, C. Represent them by numbers α, β, γ such that 0 ≤ α < β < γ ≤ 1, and assign proportions (4) is elected in Step 3a with W (C, 1) = 21 + s. It does not help the pro-A strategy to choose r > 0, because standard STV respects ballot rankings, so the supporters of A cannot improve the outcome for A by their rankings after A. It means only an increased risk of seeing C as a winner.
In a Borda tally, however, A, B, and C get 103 − s, 131 − r − s, and 56 + r + 2s points, and with r > 28, A passes B. Now it does not help to choose s > 0, because the Borda count is monotonic. It means only an increased risk that C will win.
The standard STV strategy exploits nonmonotonicity, and the Borda strategy exploits the lack of respect for ballot rankings. In tax cut STV the picture is mixed. In order to maintain a lead over C, A still cannot afford a strategy with s ≥ 15. In a tax cut STV that is anonymous, neutral, and has Σ x Q(x) = Σ i P (i), A can still win with (r, s) ∈ {(0, 13), (0, 14)}. The attempts (0, 11) and (0, 12), which sufficed under standard STV, are insufficient because B benefits from subsidiary votes from 48 − s ABC voters even though A is still running. On the other hand, tax cut STV allows a Borda-type strategy with (r, s) = (41, 0) and limit tax rates T * (A) = 69.44%, T * (B) = 100%, T * (C) = 99.42%. These strategies can be mixed. The minimal r, in order to gain a win for A, is a decreasing function of s; see Table 6 .
How common are these three-candidate single-peaked profiles where strategic voting is possible in standard STV? In real elections with many voters, single-peaked profiles are rare indeed. However, in a less extreme setting, with candidates from the moderate left (A), the center (B), and the far right (C), the logic may be just the same.
If three positions in [0, 1] are distributed independently and identically, with rectangular distribution, and called α, β, γ in increasing order, simulation shows that under standard STV with θ = 1, the following occurs in about 1.2% of the cases: C will be eliminated and B wins against A, while A may win by letting a certain number of ABC voters vote strategically CAB. Symmetrically, equally often, some supporters of C (moderate right) may defeat B (center) by voting ACB to make A (far left) survive the first round.
A total of 2.4% seems too high for real elections. Simulation under the "impartial anonymous culture," i.e., uniformly distributed (p, q, r, s, t, u) in the five-dimensional standard simplex giving the fraction of voters in ABC, ACB, CAB, CBA, BCA, BAC, respectively, combined with screening for "realism," suggests that nonmonotonicity occurs with probability about 0.9%. A real election (p = 37) had nonmonotonicity in 0.66% of the candidate triples (Stensholt (2002) ).
Monotonicity and the Intermediate Tax Cut
Tally. Now consider a single tax cut tally where the candidates are ranked according to their limit taxes. If voter i decides to interchange two consecutive candidates x and y, originally ranked as j and j + 1, respectively, in ballot φ i , then y will collect a higher revenue than before, whatever the tax rates are. However, it is not obvious that such a transposition of x and y can never hurt y in the end, because all the limit tax rates will most likely change as a consequence of this neighbor transposition in a single ballot. Fortunately, the natural result is true, at least under a small amendment.
Definition 6 (tax cut STV with reduced quota).
Under neutrality the required revenue is reduced to Q(x) = v/(p + d) for each candidate x, and under anonymity, P (i) = 1 for each voter i. Each candidate will cut the tax rate below the initial 100%. All voters keep the same fraction of their initial voting power; i.e., voter i keeps P (i) · d/(p + d) after having been taxed by all candidates. With d = 0, there is always a candidate collecting 100% tax, and a mainstream voter may have insignificant voting power left even before getting that far down (Tables 2-4) . With increasing d, a voter contributes more to distinguish between candidates near the bottom of the ranking list.
Reduced quotas are equivalent to extending each ballot at the end with a "dummy candidate," k, with a special quota
If d ∈ N one may instead add d "dummy candidates," each with the quota v/(p + d), and put them after all real candidates in every ballot. With dummy candidates added, the quota sum again satisfies the equality Σ x Q(x) = Σ i P (i) = v. Under the limit tax rate vector [T * (x)], each voter has been taxed with the same total rate p/(d + p) before offering any support to a dummy. The effect of including real candidates with insignificant support is therefore similar to introducing a reduced quota. If d > 0, T * (x) < 1 for every real candidate x, while T * (k) = 1 Assume candidate q gets the quota reduced from Q(q) to Q(q) − ∆, while Q(k) is raised to Q(k) + ∆ and Q(x) is unchanged for x / ∈ {q, k}. A new tax cutting process starting from [T * (x)] leads to a new limit tax rate vector [T * * (x)], and each candidate cuts taxes according to some non-negative surplus. The following analysis of this process repeatedly applies the uniqueness part of Theorem 1. This gives us the freedom to arrange the tax cutting in any convenient way.
When q works off the surplus ∆, a certain part of it may have to pass another real candidate, say w. Assume ∆ is small, so that the tax cuts are negligible in comparison to the tax rates. Dummy k is the only candidate who has not yet reached the quota. Consider a basic step where q starts with a maximal tax cut and releases ∆ to keep a revenue of Q(q) − ∆, and then all candidates except q and w are allowed to cut taxes. Let α = α(q, w) and β = β(q, w) be such that in the limit, q has accumulated a new surplus α∆ and w has β∆ with α + β < 1, (10) whereas (1 − α − β)∆ has been used to reduce the deficit of k.
After q's initial tax cut, at least ∆d/(p + d) will become additional support for k. Therefore, the inequality in (10) is sharpened to
Consider next a process consisting of basic steps where q, through tax cuts, gets rid of the surplus ∆. This process transfers to w an additional support of
and candidate q has been able to cut taxes corresponding to a surplus amounting to
Now let the roles of q and w be interchanged: the quota of w[k] is reduced by ∆ to Q(w) − ∆ [raised by ∆ to vd/(p + d) + ∆ ], and all others have their exact quota. Then there is a similar basic step after which q has Q(q)+δ∆ and w has accumulated a new surplus γ∆ . Here γ = α(w, q) and δ = β(w, q), and similarly to (11),
After a process of such basic steps, similarly to (12) and (13), q has surplus revenue δ 1−γ · ∆ , and w has cut taxes corresponding to a surplus
Consider finally a sequence of processes that shuffles a diminishing surplus back and forth between q and w, thus gradually transferring ∆ from q to dummy k and let
After the first process w has surplus ∆ = β 1−α · ∆; after the second process q has
During the sequence q and w have cut taxes corresponding to total surpluses of, respectively,
By (15), when Q(q) is reduced marginally to Q(q) − ∆, the adjustment to the new equilibrium lets q cut taxes corresponding to a surplus M ∆/(1 − α) and lets w cut taxes corresponding to a surplus m qw M ∆/(1 − α). Usually α, β, γ, and δ are small numbers. If 0 ≤ α, β, γ, δ < 1/4, then
Is the ranking according to limit tax rates monotonic? Consider a "critical" counterexample where voter 1 (say) ranks x as j, y as j + 1, and y defeats z, but transposition of x and y in ballot 1 makes z defeat y. That means that y is hurt by advancing one step on ballot 1.
Allow voter 1 to give weight 1 − s to the original ballot and s to the ballot after transposition, s ∈ [0, 1]. At this "s-profile," for an arbitrary tax vector [T (c)] voter 1 then pays taxes to
where
By (17), an increase of s by µ increases y's and reduces x's total revenue by µT (x)T (y)P , while for (i, c) / ∈ {(1, x), (1, y)} the support from voter i to candidate c does not depend on s. Choose s ∈ (0, 1) to make a tie between y and z, and let [T * o (c)] be the limit tax vector at the s-profile. [T * o (c) ] is nonmonotonic in the way described above, the s-profile violates the condition α (x, z), β(x, z), α(z, x), β(z, x), α(y, z), β(y, z), α(z, y), β(z, y) 
Theorem 2. Assume Q(y) = Q(z). If the ranking according to
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that the theorem is false. Choose a small , and let [T * 1 (c)] be the limit tax vector at profile s + . Thus, for arbitrarily small ,
The inequality (18) is counter-intuitive: with increased s, i.e., increased support for y, we expect y to win the tax cutting contest with z. Assuming the conditions hold, we will derive a contradiction to (18). At profile s + , but with tax vector [T * o (c)], y has a surplus ∆, x has a deficit ∆, and all other candidates have their exact quota. There are two cases.
If x = z, y first cuts taxes for at least ∆ and this causes x to cut taxes for < (3∆/2)/3 = ∆/2. Then x raises taxes for at least ∆ and this causes y to raise taxes for < ∆/2. In total, y cuts taxes for > ∆/2 and x raises taxes for > ∆/2. Since
If x = z, y starts by cutting taxes for k∆ with 1 ≤ k < 3/2, which causes z to cut taxes for < k∆/3, the difference being at least 2∆/3 in favor of y. Then x raises taxes for at most 3∆/2, which causes y and z to raise taxes for at most ∆/2. Even if z as a net result cuts taxes, y cuts taxes for at least 2∆/3 − ∆/2 = ∆/6 more than z. 
In the situation of (10) there is a release ∆ (from q), from which w keeps at most ∆/(d + 1), and at most ∆p/(p + d) is deposited among real candidates apart from q to be released again. Thus the second release is at most ∆p/(p + d), and q and w each keep at most
2 is released the third time, etc. Thus at most
are kept by q and w, respectively, after a basic step. Therefore, by (10),
Hence d Table 5 (that RV could be removed after only 3 iterations), because the last real candidate to cut tax from 100% may perhaps overtake some other candidate in the further tax cutting contest.
Example 1 (cont'd) . Dummy candidates may actually make a difference, at least in an almost even pairwise contest. Table 7 shows the result of a tax cut tally on the data from Example 1 with dummies added in the same order to all ballots. For d = 0 we repeat the first line of When d decreases, the required tax rates increase, which favors the controversial F rP over the compromise candidate KrF . To see why, consider two voters who rank x > y > z and z > y > x, respectively, from the top; assume T (x) = T (z); and express the revenues collected by x and y from the two voters. The compromise candidate y must charge
in order to collect as much tax from the two voters as each of the competitors x and z collects. Decreasing d means increasing tax rates and therefore increasing the ratio T (y)/T (x).
Reversed Ballots.
The examples of nonmonotonicity in the STV variations discussed above are built on eliminations. The idea behind the associated strategic voting is to obtain transfer of votes to a candidate x by means of eliminating a candidate y, who most likely must be politically close to x (since otherwise there might not be enough subsidiary support for x among the voters who rank y first). Such eliminations are avoided when the tally is based on the reversed rankings in each ballot, because then only elected candidates are removed from the race.
Definition 7 (reversed tax cut STV). 
We interpret w * (i, t) as the "frustration level" of voter i and will let i start the next tally with weight
As before, we let the highest possible weight be 1:
To find a(t) and b(t), sum over i in (21), substitute (19) and (20), and use (22):
with t = 0, 1, . . . , s − 1. It is possible that w(i, t + 1) > w(i, t), which is not the case in standard STV.
Example 1 (cont'd). Application of reversed tax cut STV (d = 0, θ = 1, and s = 3 seats) to the real data above gives Table 8 .
So H, Ap, and KrF win seats 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Comment 4. In reversed tax cut STV a voter gives "antisupport" to the candidates, starting from the bottom of the ballot, and a candidate x starts to cut the tax (i.e., reject more antisupport) when the quota S(x) = v/(p + 1 − t) is reached. Intermediate tally t does not consider the identity of candidate R(i, j) before it is clear that candidates R(i, j + 1), . . . , R(i, p) are already elected or forced to reduce taxes, and hence will be barred from winning seat t. This argument breaks down if dummies are added on top of the ballots.
As shown in Table 8 , only elected candidates leave the race; after intermediate tally 1, H emerges as the winner and is removed from the contest. The particular strategy of Example 2 is not possible with the reversed STV. The main source for nonmonotonicity and associated opportunities for strategic voting have been removed, because when a candidate leaves the race, it is by being elected, and one more seat thereby becomes occupied.
Comment 5. Similarly to Coombs's elimination criterion in standard STV (Comment 1), reversed tax cut STV gives priority to information from the bottom end of the ballots. Therefore, it has an "avoid-the-worst" property that makes it more favorable to candidates in the political center than the top-to-bottom tax cut algorithm (Definition 5). Compare, e.g., the controversial F rP and the politically central KrF and V in Tables 7 and 1. An obvious idea for strategic manipulation is to exploit the "avoid-the-worst" property and give a candidate too many bottom ranks to remain at 100% until the end. In a single-seat constituency a determined avoid-H group of more than 1/8 of the voters can achieve their goal by strategically ranking H last; that forces H to reduce the tax below 100%, and some other candidate will get first place in the final ranking, provided d = 0. With p candidates and v voters, a group of more than v/p voters could prevent the election of a candidate. Thus, in elections with small v/p this becomes a concern. However, with d > 0, i.e., with dummies in the tally, a candidate like H has some protection against such a strategy.
Conclusion.
How to choose between voting systems? What is the least of many evils? General impossibility theorems tell us that unpleasant choices are unavoidable, but each proposed voting method must be examined in some detail before the choices can be clearly presented. How can modifications in the rules reduce weaknesses and not throw away too many of the advantages of a class of election methods like the STV family? The best-known members of the family suffer from nonmonotonicity, which may well be considered the ugliest of the known election system maladies, since it means that voters cannot be guaranteed that a top rank is the best support to their favorite. Nonmonotonicity may be seen as a consequence of method designers being too eager to exterminate another disease, namely disrespect for ballot rankings (Definition 1). The guarantee that standard and Meek STV respect ballot rankings is a commonly used "pro" argument, and justly so. But the price can be discussed. Two possible eliminations in the tally process may release essentially different new ballot information. That creates the "instability" where some voters may change strategically from xzy to zxy with the result that x wins instead of y. This is very risky and therefore not an attractive gambit. It is more reason for concern that voters who honestly change from zxy to xzy may cause y to win instead of x. Moreover, nonmonotonicity is not the only flaw related to this instability. Related to nonmonotonicity is the "no-show paradox" noted by Fishburn and Brams (1983) .
Nonmonotonicity and the No-Show Paradox.
In an election with three candidates, A, B, and C, assume A is a clear plurality winner, while in pairwise comparisons B beats A and A beats C. Thus B is also a Condorcet winner unless there is a Condorcet cycle, but the latter is very rare in real elections with many independent voters. Moreover, assume that B and C are about equal in terms of top ranks. Elimination of C lets B win, but it is likely to be a case of nonmonotonicity, which the ABC voters and ACB voters may overcome or exploit by letting suitably many vote strategically CAB. Then B is eliminated and A wins, but another type of strategy is likely to be available for the CBA voters: they may sacrifice their favorite, C, in order to help B to the "instant run-off" by voting BCA or even by not showing up at the election. The latter possibility is called "the no-show paradox."
Here is a profile with 1608 voters and three candidates from Fishburn and Brams (1983) In the left-hand pictogram of Figure 2 , six areas are proportional to these numbers (Stensholt (1996) ). The relatively large triangle in the middle (2.035% of the circle area) indicates that the profile is unrealistic, but it is easy to make similar realistic examples, as in the right-hand graphic, which corresponds to a candidate triple in the plane, analogous to the single-peak profile in Figure 1 . Being accidentally barred by a car breakdown from voting in the mayoral election in their town, Mrs. and Mr. Smith could not save their friend B (Mrs. Bitt) from elimination with 417 + 82 = 499 votes, which was less than the 357 + 143 = 500 cast for the also very acceptable H (Mr. Huff). However, this turned out to be a blessing in disguise because H went on to beat the obnoxious W (Dr. Wogg) with 917 to 691 in the instant run-off, while without the providential car breakdown the Smiths would have shown up at the polls and voted BHW as planned-only to see W humiliate B with 966 to (642 + 2) in the instant run-off.
A similar piece of literary effort might have described the frustration among the supporters of W when they see their beloved leader being punished for getting too much support: if just t of the 285 W BH voters had instead voted BW H, then W would still have met and defeated B in the instant run-off with 966 − t to 642 + t, 2 ≤ t ≤ 161. Theoretically, the 417 BHW voters could have prevented this by a massive transfer to HBW , but most of them do not think like the Smiths: they consider H only slightly better than W and prefer to express their support for B. Moreover, the fact that would-be BHW voters might get H elected instead of W by voting strategically HBW reduces the importance of the no-show paradox. A move from BHW to HBW is a more reliable strategy than abstention, and it builds on a property that is much less objectionable than no-show or nonmonotonicity: That a transition from BHW to HBW weakens B and/or strengthens H is actually just as it should be.
A remedy against nonmonotonicity in a three-candidate single-seat STV is to define W as a winner in a case like this, legalizing an initial transfer of a suitable number x of surplus votes from W BH to BW H. The criterion is that the profile satisfies four inequalities (Stensholt (2002) The initial transfer is performed by the tally officials or their computers the same way as all vote transfers in the STV rules. This legalized transfer is also likely to reduce the probability that the no-show paradox will play a role in real elections. In the story above, a no-show paradox would require that car breakdowns prevent the Smiths and 161 other BHW voters from showing up at the polls.
However, this initial transfer rule is incompatible with respect for ballot rankings: If sufficiently many voters change from HW B to HBW , they make sure that B wins an instant run-off with W . Thereby they violate one of the inequalities and break the criterion for legalized transfer. Thus preventing an initial transfer from W BH to BW H, candidate H then survives the first tally round and wins.
In the p-candidate case one may consider tallying each of the p(p − 1)(p − 2)/6 triples separately with a monotonic method (e.g., plurality or the "legalized transfer method") and award one point to the winner of each triple. Theoretically, monotonicity may then be violated for another reason: Changing some ballots from . . . xy . . . z . . . to . . . yx . . . z . . . may let y snatch a point from z in the triple {x, y, z}, and that may cause x to overtake z. However, such snatches may be too rare to cause a significant problem in realistic p-candidate profiles where x and z are the main contenders.
The no-show paradox also occurs outside the STV family: all Condorcet extensions for four or more candidates suffer from the no-show paradox (Moulin (1988) ). On the other hand, there exist nonmonotonic election rules without this extra weakness (Campbell and Kelly (2002) ).
STV without Eliminations.
Elimination in the tally process of a candidate according to some criterion is a prominent feature of most STV methods but is also used in the Nanson method. In a Nanson election, however, the elimination criterion builds on all the ballot information, and if a small profile change lets candidate y be eliminated instead of z, this seems less likely to change the final result in a counterintuitive way than in standard STV. A monotonic STV in single-seat elections is possible with legalized initial transfers in triples. To give a roughly proportional distribution of several seats, this idea should be combined with a mechanism with the same effect as the weight reduction in standard or Meek STV. Some other ideas are discussed above, e.g., to use the tax cut algorithm on the reversed ballots, so that only elected candidates leave the race. In standard or Meek STV, the lower end of any ballot ranking does not count before the last tally rounds, and in some ballots only the top rank is ever considered. With increasing value of the parameter d (reduced quotas) both ends of a ballot ranking get more equal influence. As always, there is a price to be discussed, in particular how often and how badly the ballot rankings are not respected (in the technical sense of Definition 1).
